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COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: INFRINGER'S BAD
FAITH CONDUCT AND COMMERCIAL GAIN
NEGATES FAIR USE
On November 2, 1976, Jimmy Carter was elected President of the
United States.' The election signaled an end to years of upheaval caused
by the Watergate crisis and the subsequent Nixon pardon. Harper &
Row Publishers knew that former President Gerald Ford had a story to
tell and contracted with him to write his memoirs about those tumultu-
ous years. Before Harper & Row published Mr. Ford's memoirs, The
Nation, a political commentary magazine, used direct quotes and para-
phrases from the unpublished manuscript in one of its own articles. In
Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,2 ("Harper & Row") the
United States Supreme Court held that the unauthorized use of quotes
from the unpublished memoirs of a public figure which infringed the
copyright holder's right to first publication was not a "fair use" under
section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Act").
3
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In February 1977, after President Ford left office, Harper & Row
and the Reader's Digest Association (hereinafter collectively referred to
1. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 3, 1976, at I, col. 6.
2. 471 U.S. 539, 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985), rev'g 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'g 557 F.
Supp. 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice
Brennan wrote the dissent, joined by Justices White and Marshall.
3. The 1976 Act provides that: -IT]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclu-
sive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work .
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
Further, the 1976 Act codified the doctrine of fair use:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit education purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
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as "Harper & Row") agreed to publish Mr. Ford's memoirs "concerning
the Watergate crisis, Mr. Ford's pardon of former President Nixon, and
'Mr. Ford's reflection on this period of history, and the morality and
personalities involved.' "" The manuscript was to include matters which
were not previously published.5 Furthermore, the contract provided that
the memoirs would be published in book form and that Harper & Row
would have the exclusive rights to prepublication excerpts.6
Two years after entering into the contract, Mr. Ford's memoirs were
nearly completed.7 Harper & Row entered into an agreement with Time,
a weekly magazine for Harper & Row's prepublication excerpt rights.
Time's prepublication rights only extended to the use of 7,500 words
which concerned the Nixon pardon from the unpublished manuscript.
Time paid $12,500 in advance and contingently agreed to pay an addi-
tional $12,500 upon Time's publication of the excerpts.8
Under the contract, Time retained the right to renegotiate the sec-
ond payment if the excerpts were published elsewhere prior to the Time's
release. 9 As a result, Harper & Row instituted measures to protect the
unpublished manuscript from unauthorized release. However, two to
three weeks before the Time article was to be released, Victor Navasky,
editor of The Nation, obtained an unauthorized copy of Mr. Ford's
manuscript. '0
Mr. Navasky was fully aware that the manuscript was unauthorized
since he knew that it must be promptly returned. Immediately, he wrote
an article entitled "The Ford Memoirs: Behind The Nixon Pardon,"
which appeared in The Nation on April 3, 1979. Mr. Navasky's article
was comprised of quotes, paraphrases and facts from the unpublished
Ford manuscript. He did no additional research nor did he make any
additional commentary because he wanted The Nation article to appear
prior to Harper & Row's publication of the book. As a result, Time can-
4. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2221. The unpublished manuscript was entitled "A Time
to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford." Id. [Official reporter was unavailable at the
time of publication; therefore, all cites to Harper & Row are to unofficial reporter.]
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2221-22. Exclusive rights of prepublication excerpts are also known as first se-
rial rights. Id. at 2222.
7. Trevor Armbrister, a professional writer and senior editor for Reader's Digest, aided
Mr. Ford in writing his memoirs. Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) ["Harper & Row H"].
8. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2222. The Ford memoirs also included references to his
childhood, career in Congress, family, and insights concerning various public figures Harper &
Row v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1983) ["Harper & Row II"].
9. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2222.
10. Id. The identity of Mr. Navasky's source is unknown. Id.
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celled its article scheduled to be published in the April 23, 1979 issue and
refused to make the second payment to Harper & Row."
Harper & Row subsequently filed suit in the United States District
Court of the Southern District of New York against Nation Enter-
prises. 12 The suit alleged copyright infringement and state law violations
for conversion and tortious interference with contract.
A. The District Court Opinion
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that The Nation infringed Harper & Row's copyright and that
the use was not protected by the doctrine of fair use. Before trial, the
district court determined that Harper & Row's state law claims were pre-
empted by the Act and dismissed the claims for conversion and tortious
interference with contract.
Initially, the district court granted Nation Enterprises' ("Nation")
motion to dismiss Harper & Row's pendent state law claims of conver-
sion and tortious interference with contract. 13 The court interpreted that
the legislative intent of the Copyright Act, specifically section 301, " 'is
to preempt and abolish any rights under the common law or statutes of a
state that are equivalent to copyright and that extend to works within the
scope of the Federal copyright law.' "'4
The district court applied a two-part test for determining whether
preemption of state law exists. First, the district court considered
whether the nature of the manuscript in which rights were claimed came
11. Id.
12. Harper & Row II, 557 F. Supp. at 1067. This is the reported decision concerning the
copyright infringement claim.
13. Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
["Harper & Row I"]. This is the reported decision concerning dismissal of state law claims.
14. Id. at 850, (citing H.R. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1976)).
Section 301 of the Copyright Act provides the statutory basis for preemption:
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections
102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or
unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled
to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or
statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the com-
mon law or statutes of any State with respect to- . ..
3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106.
17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
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within the subject matter of the Act defined in sections 102 and 103.15
Second, the court analyzed whether the state law claims, which were as-
serted, were the equivalent of any exclusive right protected by the Act
under section 106.16
Copyright protection under the Act subsists for works of authorship
in a fixed tangible medium of expression.17 The court concluded that the
unpublished manuscript came within the protection of the Act.'8 More-
over, it was unnecessary to prove for preemption purposes that the work
had "sufficient originality to qualify for copyright protection under Sec-
tion 102."'"
Next, the district court considered whether Harper & Row's state
law claims were equivalent to the exclusive rights of copyright holders
specified in section 106 of the Act. In order for the state law claims to
stand, they must be qualitatively different from the enumerated rights.
First, the district court determined that the conversion claim was
equivalent to Harper & Row's exclusive right to reproduce and distribute
a copyrighted work under the Act.2° Second, the court found that the
tortious interference with contract claim was analogous to Harper &
Row's "exclusive right to 'prepare derivative works based on the copy-
righted work'.., and 'to distribute copies.., of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership.' "21 Consequently, the
court held that the state law claims were preempted by the Act.
Nation asserted that its use of the unpublished manuscript was not
an infringement of Harper & Row's prepublication rights. Nation
presented three arguments to support its use of Ford's unpublished
15. See infra note 17. The Act provides that:
(a) The subject matter of copyright ... includes compilations and derivative
works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright
subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used
unlawfully.
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the ma-
terial contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preex-
isting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or
enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in
the preexisting material.
17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
16. Harper & Row I, 501 F. Supp. at 850.
17. The 1976 Act provides that "copyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device .... 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
18. Harper & Row I, 501 F. Supp. at 850-51.
19. Id. at 851.
20. Id. at 852.
21. Id. at 853, (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982)).
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memoirs: (1) the use of the memoirs by Nation was protected by the
First Amendment;22 (2) the use of the unpublished manuscript by Nation
was a fair use under section 107 of the Act;23 and, (3) the Ford manu-
script was not protected by the Act.2 4
The district court summarily dismissed Nation's assertion that its
use was protected by the First Amendment. The court determined that
the First Amendment, in this instance, did not provide Nation with any
greater protection than the fair use doctrine. As a result, the district
court limited its analysis to the applicability of the fair use doctrine.2"
Nation contended also that the Ford memoirs were "news" and that
any information about the Nixon pardon was "hot news."26 According
to Nation, any use of the Ford manuscript was a fair use and not an
infringement of the copyright owner's rights. The district court looked
to the guidelines for fair use set out in section 107 of the Act in order to
determine whether Nation's article was news reporting and permissible
under the fair use doctrine.27 The district court pointed out that "hot
news" concerning the Nixon pardon was previously disclosed by Mr.
Ford in his 1974 testimony before the Congressional Committee. In fact,
the testimony was fully covered by the press. 28 The court concluded that
the information taken by Nation from the Ford memoirs regarding the
Nixon pardon was not "hot news" which would have permitted its use of
the copyrighted materials.29
In addition to making other findings,3° the district court agreed with
Nation that the historical facts and memoranda presented by Mr. Ford
were not per se copyrightable. But, the court determined that the unpub-
lished manuscript was copyrightable based upon the "totality" of Ford's
work. The court viewed the facts and memoranda as integral parts of
Ford's memoirs together with his reflections. The district court held that
when viewed in its totality instead of its component parts, Ford's manu-
22. Harper & Row I, 557 F. Supp. at 1070 n.4.
23. Id. at 1072.
24. Id. at 1070.
25. Id. at 1070 n.4.
26. Id. at 1070. The court opinion does not distinquish between the terms "news" and
"hot news."
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1071.
29. Id. at 1072.
30. The district court made further determinations: (1) Nation purloined the manuscript
and used it for its own profit; (2) Nation used information from a manuscript which was soon
to be published; (3) Nation took the heart of the material which was subject to the Time
prepublication agreement; and, (4) The effect of Nation's publication caused Time to rescind
its contract with Harper & Row. Id.
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script was protected by the Act.3'
B. The Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismis-
sal of Harper & Row's state law claims and reversed the lower court's
decision concerning copyright infringement.
3 2
In affirming the dismissal of the state law claims, the appellate court
stated that the unauthorized temporary taking of the manuscript did not
give rise to a claim of conversion. "Merely removing one of a number of
copies of a manuscript (with or without permission) for a short time,
copying parts of it and returning it undamaged, constitutes far too insub-
stantial an interference with property rights to demonstrate conver-
sion." 33 Further, the appellate court found that the claim of tortious
interference with contractual relations was not qualitatively different
from the claim of copyright infringement.34
The appellate court determined that the purpose of the Copyright
Act was not to "impede that harvest of knowledge so necessary to a dem-
ocratic state."35  The threshold issue considered by the court was
whether the purloined material was a proper subject matter to be af-
forded copyright protection.36 In order for a manuscript to be protected
by the Act, it must be an original work of authorship.37 Even though
31. Id. at 1073.
32. Harper & Row 111, 723 F.2d at 195. Judge Kaufman wrote the opinion of the court in
the 2-1 decision.
In his dissent, Judge Meskill agreed with the lower court's finding that the Copyright Act
protects the entire manuscript. Even though the facts presented were not copyrightable, the
Act protected the author's original expression and presentation. Id. at 213. Nation could have
used the facts contained in the memoirs without infringing Harper & Row's rights. However,
Nation "did no more than appropriate the same quotes, expressions, selection of language,
events, corrobation and recreations that were present in the Ford memoirs and that added
nothing original of its own." Id. at 214.
However, the dissent did agree with the majority's determination that The Nation article
was a "news" article. The Nation could have written a news article describing the book or
disclosing facts contained therein but instead, Nation stepped beyond reasonable and fair use.
The article lacked sufficient originality. Nation's use of Ford's original expressions was unrea-
sonable and excessive. The dissent concluded that Nation's use of the Ford memoirs did not
come within the doctrine of fair use. Id. at 216.
33. Id. at 201.
34. "[T]he fact that cross-appellants pleaded additional elements of awareness and inten-
tional interference, not part of a copyright infringement claim, goes merely to the scope of the
right; it does not establish qualitatively different conduct on the part of the infringing party,
nor a fundamental nonequivalence between the state and federal rights implicated." Id.
35. Id. at 197.
36. Id. at 202.
37. Id.
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historical facts are not protected, the Act does extend to an author's ar-
rangement of the facts.3" The appellate court determined that Nation's
use of "scattered parts" from Ford's manuscript did not infringe those
original portions which were the subject matter of the Act.3 9 The appel-
late court rejected the lower court's analysis that the totality of the man-
uscript was protected by the Act.
The Second Circuit espoused additional reasons for finding the man-
uscript to be outside the scope of copyrightable material. It balanced the
interests of the copyright holder against the public's need for information
and determined that the Act "was not intended to provide ... a private
monopoly of fact at the expense of the public's need to be informed."'
Furthermore, the appellate court pointed out that much of the informa-
tion taken from Ford's memoirs had been previously made public by Mr.
Ford's testimony in 1974 before the Congressional Committee which had
been printed in the Congressional Record.4 The appellate court con-
cluded that the information was not subject matter protected by the
Act.42 Finally, the appellate court decided that conversations attributa-
ble to other parties which were included in the manuscript were not Mr.
Ford's original work. Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that
once the "uncopyrighted material was stripped away, The Nation con-
tain[ed], at most, approximately 300 words that [were] copyrighted."43
Finally, the appellate court rejected the lower court's determination
that Nation's taking of portions of the manuscript was not a fair use. In
rejecting the lower court's decision, the appellate court analyzed whether
Nation's use of approximately 300 words of copyrighted material was a
fair use, thereby limiting its fair use analysis to the 300 words which it
had previously determined to be copyrightable. 44
The appellate court examined the case in light of the fair use guide-
lines set out in section 107 of the Act and determined that the lower
court's analysis was faulty. First, the appellate court emphasized that
38. Id. at 202-03.
39. Id. at 203.
40. Id. at 205.
41. In 1974, President Ford testified before the Hungate Committee which was a Subcom-
mittee on Criminal Justice for the House Committee on the Judiciary investigating the Water-
gate fiasco. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 206. "They include a short segment of Ford's conversations with Henry Kis-
singer and several other individuals. Ford's impressionistic depictions of Nixon, ill with phle-
bitis after the resignation and pardon, and of Nixon's character, constitute the major portion of
this material. It is these parts of the magazine piece on which we must focus in our examina-
tion of the question whether there was a 'fair use' of copyrighted matter." Id.
44. Id.
1987]
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even though the "purpose and character" of Nation's use might have
been for profit, without additional evidence, that fact is "legally irrele-
vant where the work in which the use appears offers some benefit to the
public."4"
Secondly, the "nature of the copyrighted work" was essentially fac-
tual. The appellate court stressed that courts should narrowly construe
copyright protection for factual books and that the district court erred by
extending copyright protection to the "totality" of the memoirs.46
Thirdly, the appellate court decided that most portions of the Ford
manuscript that were taken by Nation were not copyrighted. The court
reasoned that the approximately 300 words used by Nation were insub-
stantial in relation to the entire 2,250 word Nation article. Moreover, the
brief passages and short descriptions taken by Nation from the memoirs
were not superfluous nor excessive but informative.47
The appellate court reasoned that Nation's use of the Ford manu-
script was minimal. Additionally, the fact that Nation had borrowed the
manuscript had "dubious" economic impact on the copyright holder. In
reaching this conclusion, the appellate court expressed concern that the
Act might interfere with the public's knowledge of vital and historical
facts. As a result, the appellate court held that Nation's taking was a fair
use.
48
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. Justice O'Connor's Opinion
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, reversed and found that Na-
tion's unauthorized use of Ford's memoirs was not permitted as a fair
use. In general, the Court found that Nation's use was not excused be-
cause the public had an interest in Nixon's pardon. Also, Nation's use of
the unpublished manuscript resulted in economic damage to Harper &
Row. Finally, the use made by Nation was not sanctioned by the doc-
trine of fair use. Section 107 was not designed to give infringers free
access to unpublished, copyrighted memoirs of public figures.49
1. Harper & Row's Right to First Publication
The Supreme Court determined that Nation's unauthorized taking
45. Id. at 207-08.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2235.
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claimed to itself Harper & Row's right to first publication. According to
the Court, Nation did not dispute that verbatim copying of excerpts con-
stituted infringement unless excused as fair use. Thus, the Court did not
concern itself with the copyrightability of the manuscript.5"
The Court examined the legislative history behind the judicially cre-
ated doctrine of fair use which was codified in section 107. Initially, the
Court emphasized the importance of the fact that the manuscript was
unpublished at the time of Nation's use. Under common law copyright,
a work belonged to an author until the author published or parted with
the work. Additionally, courts could find that the author impliedly con-
sented to the use of the work by others once it was published.5 The
Court cited references to the legislative history behind section 107 show-
ing that the unpublished nature of a work was a key factor in negating a
defense of fair use.
52
The Act gave an author's work statutory protection at the time of
creation. A work is "created" when it is fixed in a tangible medium53
such as when it is typewritten on a sheet of paper. One of the rights
which the Act confers is the right to first publication. The copyright
holder has control of the first public distribution of the copyrighted
work.5 4 The author's control of the first public dissemination gives the
author creative control as well as enabling the author to exploit prepubli-
cation rights. It is a valuable right which, under ordinary circumstances,
supersedes a claim of fair use.55
Nation contended that the First Amendment permits use of infor-
mation of high public concern. It asserted that the public's interest in the
50. Id. at 2224-25. However, the Court did indicate the copyrightability issue was an
unsettled area of law:
Perhaps the controversy between the lower courts in this case over copyright-
ability is more aptly styled a dispute over whether The Nation's appropriation of
unoriginal and uncopyrightable elements encroached on the originality embodied in
the work as a whole. Especially in the realm of factual narrative, the law is currently
unsettled regarding the ways in which uncopyrightable elements combine with the
author's original contributions to form protected expression.
Id. at 2224.
51. Id. at 2226.
52. Id. at 2227. In illustrating that the unpublished nature of a work figures prominently
in negating fair use the Court quoted from the Senate Report on the Copyright Law Revision:
A key, though not necesarily determinative factor in fair use is whether or not
the work is available to the potential use . . . . The applicability of the fair use
doctine to unpublished works is narrowly limited since, although the work is unavail-
able, this is the result of a deliberate choice on the part of the copyright owner ....
Id., (citing S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 64).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
54. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2226-27.
55. Id. at 2228.
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information contained in Ford's memoirs outweighed the author's right
to first publication. In response, the Supreme Court stated that First
Amendment protections were built into the Act.56 The Act offers protec-
tion to the original expression of the ideas, but not to the ideas them-
selves. Absent such a rule, a public figure would have little incentive to
create memoirs. As a result, the public would be denied an important
source of significant historical information.57 Furthermore, to accept
Nation's argument would be tantamount to holding that memoirs of pub-
lic figures were not protected by the Act.58
2. The Doctrine of Fair Use
Section 107 prescribes four non-exclusive factors to consider on a
case-by-case basis in determining what is fair use of copyrighted works:
"(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copy-
righted work; (3) the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and, (4) the effect on the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work."59 The doctrine was enacted as an
equitable rule of reason which was developed by earlier case law. In ac-
cordance with the judge-made doctrine, no general applicable definition
of fair use was enacted to insure that it was determined on a case-by-case
basis.6
The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court that the in-
fringement of copyrighted material for the purpose of news reporting was
one factor tending to show fair use. Moreover, Nation acted properly in
seeking to be the first to publish the information. However, Nation did
more than merely report on the uncopyrightable information contained
in the memoirs. Nation "actively sought to exploit the headline value of
its infringement, making a 'news event' out of its unauthorized first pub-
lication of a noted figure's copyrighted expression."61
Another factor weighing against fair use was Nation's profit from
the unauthorized publication of the Ford memoirs. The Supreme Court
found that unauthorized commercial use of copyrighted material was
presumptively unfair to a copyright holder. It was not important
56. Id. at 2230.
57. Id. at 2228. "In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a market-
able right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create
and disseminate ideas." Id. at 2230.
58. Id. at 2230.
59. Id. at 2231.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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whether profit was the infringer's motive, but whether the user might
have profited from the unauthorized exploitation of the copyrighted
material.62
In conclusion, the Supreme Court decided that Nation's stated pur-
pose for using the memoirs was to "scoop" Time's and Harper & Row's
publications. Fair use presupposes that a user acts in good faith with fair
dealing. Nation could have sought publication rights from Harper &
Row, in the same manner that Time did. The factors that negated fair
use outweighed the "news" value of Nation's article.
At the time of Nation's use, Ford's memoirs could have been de-
scribed as an unpublished historical narrative or autobiography. Gener-
ally, a policy exists in favor of disseminating factual works to the public.
But, Nation used more of the copyrighted material than was necessary.
The facts contained in the Nation article could have been conveyed with-
out using Ford's subjectively descriptive passages and portraits of public
figures.63
The unpublished status of the work was a key factor of its "nature"
which tended to weigh against fair use. "The scope of fair use is nar-
rower with repect to unpublished works." ' Mr. Ford and Harper &
Row attempted to keep the manuscript confidential. Also, Nation knew
that the copy of the manuscript which it received was not authorized.
On this issue, the Court determined Nation's use was unfair.65
Next, the Supreme Court examined the amount and substantiality of
the portion used by Nation in relation to the entire Ford manuscript.
The Court rejected the Second Circuit's determination that the amount
taken was insubstantial. Instead, the portions used were among the most
powerful passages in the memoirs.
Approximately thirteen percent of Nation's article came from the
memoirs. The statutory language of the Act indicated that the use is not
excused when the taking is substantial in comparison with the infringing
work. The test for determining the substantiality of the portions used is a
comparison of the copyrighted material used and the entire copyrighted
work. Since Nation stripped verbatim quotes from the heart of chapters
relating the Nixon pardon, Nation's use was not fair.66
Effect-on-the-market "is undoubtedly the single most important ele-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2232.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2233.
66. Id. at 2233-34.
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ment of fair use.",67 The Supreme Court found that clear-cut evidence
existed that Nation's unauthorized publication led to Time's cancellation
of the contract. Harper & Row suffered a loss of $12,500 because Nation
infringed its right to first publication; thus, Harper & Row incurred eco-
nomic damages.
The Court emphasized the effect-on-the-market factor because "if
the challenged use 'should become widespread, it would adversely affect
the potential market for the copyrighted work.' "68 Once the copyright
holder establishes a prima facie case that the infringer has caused dam-
age, the burden of proof shifts to the infringer. The infringer must then
rebut by showing that the damages would have occurred regardless of
the use by the infringer. Nation did not rebut the evidence that Harper
& Row's damages were caused by Nation's article.69
B. The Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Brennan feared that the majority's goal of pro-
tecting the creative incentives of copyright holders would stifle the broad
dissemination of ideas. Justice Brennan rejected the narrow interpreta-
tion of fair use. He argued that the public is "ill served by this con-
stricted reading of the fair use doctrine."'7' He contended that the arena
of public debate and informed citizenry is the essence of self-
government. 7'
First, Justice Brennan asserted that information qua information is
not copyrightable. In order for Nation to be liable for infringement, Na-
tion's article must have been too close to Ford's original expression.72
The linguistic similarities between Nation's article and Ford's manu-
script were insufficient to constitute infringement.73 Much of the mat-
erial used by Nation was not copyrighted. Merely paraphrasing
copyrighted material does not constitute infringement since infringement
"requires far more close and substantial a tracking of the original lan-
guage than occurred in this case."' 74 Moreover, Nation's article did not
copy the structure of Ford's memoirs. Rather, the article did no more
67. Id. at 2234. See also, supra note 55.
68. Id. at 2234-35, (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984))
["Sony"] (Emphasis in original).
69. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2234.
70. Id. at 2240.
71. Id. at 2242.
72. Id. at 2243.
73. Id. at 2244.
74. Id.
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than chronicle the facts of history."
Second, Justice Brennan agreed with the appellate court's determi-
nation that only 300 words of copyrighted material appeared in Nation's
article. He applied section 107's statutory guidelines and argued that
Nation's appropriation was a fair use. The reason that Nation quoted
300 words was for the purpose of news reporting which is considered a
prime example of fair use.76 Nation's dissemination of the copyrighted
information was also in the public interest.77 Justice Brennan considered
this to be a key factor in finding fair use.
He disagreed with the majority's finding that the commercial nature
of Nation's use was a factor weighing against fair use. Instead, he as-
serted that Congress was aware that news reporting was generally for
profit when it enunciated news reporting as an example of fair use.
Third, Justice Brennan asserted that fair use is given a broader inter-
pretation for historical and factual works. A greater need exists to dis-
seminate such works than for fictional works.78 He was not concerned
with the unpublished nature of the memoirs. The manuscript was on the
eve of publication. According to Justice Brennan, Nation's article did
not interfere with Harper & Row's control of the manuscript. Instead,
Nation's publication might only have infringed the economic value of
Harper & Row's initial publication.
Fourth, Justice Brennan contended that, even though Nation may
have used the most valuable portion of the manuscript, this was "irrele-
vant to copyright analysis because copyright does not preclude a second
author's use of information and ideas." '79 He conceded that Nation ap-
propriated some of Mr. Ford's copyrighted literary form. However, the
amount used was not excessive nor inappropriate to Nation's news re-
porting purpose.8 °
Finally, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority's finding that the
effect-on-the-market is the single most important element in fair use. He
also agreed that Nation's article precipitated Time's cancellation of the
contract. But, if it were the non-copyrighted portions of the Ford
memoirs used by Nation which caused cancellation, then Nation's activ-
ity was legal. The evidence was not clear whether the use of the non-
copyrighted or copyrighted material from Ford's memoirs caused Time
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2246.
77. Id. at 2247.
78. Id. at 2248.
79. Id. at 2251.
80. Id. at 2252.
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to cancel its contract. Nation had the right to be the first to publish the
non-copyrighted information."' On this basis, Harper & Row failed to
carry its burden of showing that it was damaged by Nation's
infringement.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The doctrine of fair use developed at common law and was finally
codified in the 1976 Act. 2 In 1955, Congress funded and authorized 3
the Copyright Office to undertake a comprehensive research project to
revise the 1909 Copyright Act. The efforts resulted in thirty-five pub-
lished studies and recommendations regarding copyright law revisions.84
The Copyright Office commissioned Professor Alan Latman to study fair
use of copyrighted works."5 He asserted that the theoretical basis of fair
use stems from the idea that the copyright holder impliedly consents to
reasonable uses.8 6 The reasonableness of the use is based upon various
criteria. Some examples of proper uses include review and criticism, 7
parody and burlesque, 8 scholarly works and compilations, 9 or news
reporting. 90
As a result of the research project, the Register of Copyrights issued
a report in 1961 which recommended that the revised Act include a fair
use statute. The 1961 Report described the scope of the proposed stat-
ute. The Register stated that examples of permitted uses were "excerpts
in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment; ... short
passages in a scholarly or technical work, for illustration or clarification
of the author's observations; ... summary of an address or article, with
brief quotations, in news reports ... ."9' The Register also stated that fair
81. Id. at 2252-53.
82. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 47 reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, 5660 ["H.R. REP. No. 1476"].
83. Congress has the constitutionally granted power to make copyright law: "The Con-
gress shall have Power ... to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors .. . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings . U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8.
84. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 82, at 47.
85. A. LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDY No. 14, 86th Cong., 2d. Sess., I (H. Judici-
ary Comm. Print 1960).
86. Id. at 7.
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id. at 9.
89. Id. at 10.
90. Id. at 12.
91. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE
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use of copyrighted material was dependent on four factors: "(1) the pur-
pose of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount
and substantiality of the material used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole, and (4) the effect of the use on the copyright owner's
potential market for his work."'92 Significantly, the Register indicated
that "the competitive character of the use . . . is often the most
decisive."93
From 1961 through 1964, the Copyright Office held numerous meet-
ings and discussions in which commentators and other interest groups
participated. From the earliest discussions concerning a fair use statute,
commentators and other interested persons debated whether fair use
should be codified. For example, the Authors League of America as-
serted that fair use should not be included in the revised Act because
determination of fair use was a function of the courts.94 Also, Melville
Nimmer cautioned that "an attempt to define 'fair use,' even.., loosely
... may lead to trouble."95 But, he ultimately endorsed the codification
of fair use.96
In 1964, a preliminary draft of the revised Act that was presented to
Congress included a fair use statute. The statute was similiar to the one
that was finally codified in 1976 except that the draft did not include
reference to the commericial nor competitive nature of the infringer's
use. However, the 1964 bill did consider the potential effect that the use
might have on the market for the copyrighted work.97
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 24 (H. Judiciary
Comm. Print 1961).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 24-25.
94. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 4 316 (H.
Judiciary Comm. Print 1964).
Authors League also warned that if fair use was codified, then "[t]o make it clear that a
court is not bound-in a given instance-by any one of the cited factors, would require more
language-in fact a small treatise on fair use." Id.
95. 1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 5 315 (H. Judiciary Print 1965).
96. He suggested that the wording for the fair use statute be: "Notwithstanding the provi-
sions of Section 5 [now section 106], the fair use of a copyrighted work, as such phrase has
heretofore been judicially defined and recognized, is not an infringement of copyright." Id. at
316.
97. The 1964 Revision Bill prescribed that:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work to the extent reasonably necessary or incidential
to a legitimate purpose such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, schol-
arship, or research is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use, the factors to be considered
shall include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use;
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The proposed fair use statute underwent several revisions before it
was adopted. The drafters of section 107 were faced with a dilemma in
determining the breadth of the statute. As the legislative history indi-
cates, fair use was an equitable rule of reason developed by the courts.
However, "no real definition of the concept [had] ever emerged." 98 Ac-
cordingly, no definition of fair use was developed by the courts which
could have been incorporated into section 107. However, the courts did
"evolve a set of criteria which, though in no case ...determinative,
provide[d] some guage [sic] for balancing the equities." 99 The criteria
mirror those suggested in the 1961 Report. These criteria are relevant,
but not exclusive, in determining fair use."o The construction of section
107 was a product of the discussions and hearings leading to the 1976
Act.'0 ' In its final form, section 107 was purposefully made broad and
open-ended which allows a court to apply fair use in a case-by-case
manner.1
0 2
IV. ANALYSIS
"The doctrine of fair use has been called ... the most troublesome
in the whole law of copyright."'0 3 Section 107, as a codification of the
judge-made doctrine of fair use, adopted the equity principles present in
case law."° Because of that, the Supreme Court in Harper & Row bal-
anced the hardships to the copyright holder against the benefits to pub-
lic. ' 5 In rendering its decision, the Court was concerned with: (1) the
commercial nature of Nation's use; 106 (2) the effect of Nation's use on the
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
Id. at 5.
98. H.R. No. 1476 at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5679.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 3. The factors listed in section 107 are the judicially created guidelines.
102. H.R. No. 1476 at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5680.
103. Sony, 464 U.S. at 475.
104. "[T]he doctrine of fair use is a 'rule of reason' fashioned by judges to balance the
author's right to compensation for his work, on the one hand, against the public's interest in
the widest possible dissemination of ideas and information, on the other." Sobel, Copyright
and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 43,
51 (1971).
105. "Fair use balances the public interest in the free flow of ideas and information with the
copyright holder's interest in exclusive proprietary control of his work." Roy Export Co. v.
Columbia Broadcast System, 672 F.2d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1982).
106. Harper & Row. 105 S. Ct. at 2231.
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potential market for Ford's memoirs;10 7 (3) Nation's article as news re-
porting; 11 and, (4) the bad faith of Nation's actions.0 9
A. Commercial Gain
The Supreme Court decided that the commercial nature of Nation's
use was a significant factor that weighed against fair use. The Court's
decision was proper on both statutory and case law grounds. After many
years of discussions, commercial gain was included as a fair use factor.
The 1961 Report recommended that commercialism, as a factor against
fair use, should be included in the statute. Section 107 expressly states
that the commercial nature of the use must be considered. 10
Courts have analyzed the commercial nature of use in cases before
and after the codification of the fair use doctrine. But, courts have not
always agreed that commercial gain was a factor in the fair use analysis.
In Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House ("Rosemont"),"' Rosemont
Enterprises alleged that its copyright in a series of articles on Howard
Hughes, which were published in Look magazine, was infringed upon by
Random House's biography on Howard Hughes. The Random House
biography was based, in part, on the Look articles. Moreover, portions
of the articles were copied. Before publication of the biography,
Rosemont Enterprises filed suit for a preliminary injunction. Random
House asserted that its use of the Look articles was fair use." 2 The Sec-
ond Circuit upheld Random House's use based upon the grounds of pub-
lic interest and the lack of damages to copyright holders. The court
found that "whether an author or publisher has a commercial motive...
is irrelevant to a determination of whether a particular use of copy-
righted material in a work which offers some benefit to the public consti-
tutes a fair use."
' "1 3
However, in Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates ("Time"),'14 a
district court based its fair use determination, in part, on the commercial
gain factor. Abraham Zapruder was taking a motion picture of the Pres-
idential motorcade in Dallas on November 22, 1963. Coincidentally, the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy occurred within his camera
range. Life magazine, published by Time, Inc., bought the film from Za-
107. Id. at 2234-35.
108. Id. at 2231.
109. Id. at 2232.
110. See supra note 3.
111. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
112. Id. at 304-06.
113. Id. at 307.
114. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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pruder, and printed several frames in various issues of the magazine.
Life obtained a copyright in the film and the magazine issues. Subse-
quently, Geis Associates sought permission from Life to use frames from
the film to include in a new book. But, when Life would not consent,
Geis Associates hired an artist to make drawings based upon the Za-
pruder pictures that appeared in Life.II5
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that Geis Associates infringed the copyrighted work, but de-
termined that the use was fair."1 6 The district court stated that "[t]he
Book [was] not bought because it contained the Zapruder pictures; the
Book [was] bought because of the theory of the [authors] and its explana-
tion, supported by Zapruder pictures.""' 7 In so holding, the court found
a lack of commercial incentive on the part of the infringer.
Rosemont is distinguishable from Harper & Row in that the Ran-
dom House article contained independent research beyond the infringed
Look article. In Rosemont, the infringing article consisted of copyrighted
material, but also included original commentary based upon independent
research.1" 8 However, Nation's article was based entirely on the Ford
memoirs. Nation did not include original research or commentary.
Conversely, Time is not unlike Harper & Row. Both Time and
Harper & Row involved incidents of high public concern. However,
Harper & Row is distinguishable because Nation's use was no more than
a taking of the copyrighted work. The Nation article was merely a com-
pilation of quotes and paraphrases from the unpublished memoirs.
Neither additional research nor commentary by its author was included.
Nation stood to commercially benefit from the use of the memoirs. 19
A more recent case upon which the Court relied, Sony Corp. v. Uni-
versal Studios 20 ("Sony"), also grappled with the commercial gain issue.
In Sony, the holders of copyrights in recorded programs alleged that the
sale of video tape recorders ("VTRs") infringed their rights in the re-
corded programs.' 2 ' The crux of the issue was whether or not a viewer's
use of a VTR was fair use. In dictum, the Supreme Court stated that
115. Id. at 131.
116. Id. at 144, 146.
117. Id. at 146.
118. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 306.
119. An interesting counter-argument could be made. The Ford article in The Nation was
only one article in the particular issue. Arguably, like the Time case, readers bought The
Nation for its other articles and not strictly because of the Ford article. Accordingly, Nation
did not benefit directly from the use of the Ford memoirs.
120. Sony, 464 U.S. at 417.
121. Id. at 420.
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"every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an un-
fair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of
the copyright ... .,"122 The Court held that a VTR owner's use was non-
profit and non-commercial because the purpose of the use was for home
time-shifting so that programs might be viewed at more convenient
times.123 Therefore, the Court determined that the use of VTRs is fair
use.'24 Unlike the VTR owners, Nation's use of a copyrighted work was
for commercial use. Consistent with Sony, the Harper & Row court
properly found Nation's commercial use was a significant factor which
weighed against a determination of fair use.
B. Potential Market Effect
"'Fair use, when properly applied, is limited to copying by others
which does not materially impair the marketability of the work which is
copied.' "125 In order for the copyright holder to prevail on the issue of
potential market effect, the copyright holder needs to show "by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm
exists."126 Moreover, if the intended use is for commercial gain, then the
court presumes that future harm exists.127
Since the Harper & Row court determined that Nation's article was
for commercial gain, then potential damages did not have to be shown.
Only in situations of non-commercial use does the burden rest on the
copyright holder to prove that the infringed work effected the marketa-
bility of the copyrighted work. Regardless, the Supreme Court in Harper
& Row found that the copyright holder was damaged in the amount of
Time's cancelled payment.
128
Once the copyright holder has sustained its burden of showing po-
tential market effect, the burden shifts to the infringer. In order for the
infringer to prevail on this issue, the infringer must show that damages to
the copyright holder would have occurred even without the infringer's
use. 129 Nation's only arguments to negate the market effect factor were
that the information in the Ford memoirs were facts and that Nation's
article was news reporting.
122. Id. at 451.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 454-55.
125. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2234 (citing 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
1.10(D) at 1.10[D] (1985)).
126. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (Emphasis in the original).
127. Id.
128. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2234.
129. Id.
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C. Nation's Article as News Reporting
Prior to Harper & Row, courts confronted the issue of what consti-
tuted news reporting within the meaning of the fair use doctrine. In
Time, Zapruder's film of the Kennedy assassination was undoubtedly
news,130 and a "news event may not be copyrighted .... Life claims no
copyright in the news element of the event but only in the particular
form of record made by Zapruder."13 Moreover, according to legisla-
tive history, in determining whether matters are news, "it is important to
differentiate between the substance of the information contained . . . , i.e.
the event itself, and 'the particular form or collocation of words in which
the writer has communicated it.' ",132 The manner of presentation, ex-
pression, analysis and interpretations of events are protected by the
Act. 1 33 Harper & Row is consistent with Time and the legislative his-
tory. The Supreme Court determined that the news events and historical
facts contained in the Ford memoirs were not protected. Even though
the Ford memoirs contained news events and historical facts, Mr. Ford's
manner of expression was copyrighted. By taking the original manner of
expression and not limiting its use to facts contained in the memoirs,
Nation infringed upon the Harper & Row copyright.
D. Nation's Bad Faith Conduct
Section 107 does not expressly state that an infringer's bad faith is
an element weighing against fair use. However, case law makes bad faith
a factor that should be considered in fair use analysis. In Time, the dis-
trict court declared that "fair use presupposes good faith and fair deal-
ing. '  The doctrine of fair use is based upon good faith and common
sense. 1
35
130. In order for something to be "new" as in news reporting, Black's Law Dictionary
states that it is "an element in numerous compound terms and phrases of law, this word may
denote ...the condition of being previously unknown or of recent or fresh origin ....
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
131. Time, 293 F. Supp. at 143. The Zapruder pictures reflected creativity on the part of
the photographer. He "selected the kind of camera (movies, not snapshots), the kind of film
(color), the kind of lens (telephoto), the area in which the pictures were to be taken, the time
they were to be taken, and (after testing several sites) the spot on which the camera would be
operated." Id.
132. Wainwright Sec. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing
Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918)).
133. Id. at 95-96.
134. Time, 293 F. Supp. at 146 (citing Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright
Act, 53 IOWA L. REV. 832 (1968)). See also Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir.
1983).
135. Hearings Before the Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary House of
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[T]he rule may make a distinction between a true scholar and a
chiseler who infringes a work for personal profit. It can distin-
quish between a mere quotation and the theft of an essential
portion of a literary work, and can differentiate between the
infringer who seeks to reap where he has not sown and the
scholar who is motivated solely by the desire to add to the com-
mon reservoir of ideas and information. 
136
The essence of fair use is a balance between a copyright holder's exclu-
sive rights and absolute rights. 137 The doctrine is "based on good faith,
and most problems may be answered by recourse to the Golden Rule:
'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.' "138
In Harper & Row, Nation knowingly purloined Ford's manuscript.
The character and propriety of Nation's conduct was one of bad faith.
Multiple facts weighed against Nation in the fair use analysis. Nation
knew that the Ford manuscript was unpublished at the time of its taking
and use. Moreover, Nation was aware that Time intended to publish the
excerpts within the coming weeks. In fact, Nation's stated purpose was
to "scoop" the Time publication.139 Nation took portions of the manu-
script either literally or by close paraphrase and did no analysis of its
own. Nation's bad faith and unfair dealings with Harper & Row and
Time magazine mitigates against any fair use.
V. CONCLUSION
In the recent case of Fisher v. Dees,'" the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment in
favor of the infringer. The appellate court held that disc jockey Rick
Dees's twenty-nine-second long parody, "When Sonny Sniffs Glue," was
a fair use of Johnny Mathis's song "When Sunny Gets Blue."'' In its
analysis, the appellate court based its opinion upon the four guidelines in
section 107 and the Harper & Row decision. It determined that: (1) the
infringer's conduct was not "sufficiently blameworthy" to constitute bad
faith; "'42 and, (2) even though the parody was a commercial use, the in-
Representatives on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835, Part 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
1706. ["Hearings on H.R. 4347'.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1707.
138. Id. at 1706.
139. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2232.
140. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
141. Id. at 434.
142. Id. at 437.
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fringer rebutted any economic effect on the copyright holder. 14 3 It is
apparent that the infringer's bad faith conduct and commercial use are
important factors in the present interpretation of fair use.
In sum, the fair use doctrine in section 107 is a broad open-ended
statute. Despite its codification in 1976, no exact formula for application
of the fair use doctrine exists. The purpose of section 107 is merely to
codify existing case law without enlarging, narrowing or modifying the
doctrine. By creating a broad statute, the drafters were successful in
meeting these goals.
Courts in the future are free to apply section 107 in different ways.
As the legislative history forewarns, "the doctrine of fair use derives its
vitality from its adaptability to conditions not only as they exist today
but to new conditions which result from technological and other develop-
ments."'" The doctrine of fair use, if made more specific, "would de-
stroy its vitality and its ability to accomodate itself to all conditions and
to those as yet unforeseen."' 45
Judith Thais Gibson
143. Id. at 438.
144. Hearings on H.R. 4347 at 1706.
145. Id.
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